Article 9 and Security Interests In Instruments, Documents of Title and Goods by Freedheim, Eugene H. & Goldston, Eli
Article 9 and Security Interests In Instruments,
Documents of Title and Goods
EUGENE H. FREEDHmI* A-zm EI GOLDSTON**
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS
A previous paper has compared the provisions of Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter called the "Code")
with existing Ohio law relating to security interests in accounts,
contract rights, and chattel paper.1 This paper continues the com-
parison with respect to (a) the remaining two subclassifications of
intangible personal property (i.e., "documents of title" and "instru-
ments") and (b) tangible personal property (called "goods" by the
Code and subclassified into "inventory," "equipment," "consumer
goods" and "farm products"). The reader is referred to the previous
paper for an introduction to Article 9 and a discussion of its major
policies; this paper will be concerned with detail rather than with
perspective.
The Code in § 1-201 (15) defines "document of title" as includ-
ing a "bill of lading, dock warrant, dock receipt, warehouse receipt
or order for the delivery of goods, and also any other document
which in the current course of business or financing is treated as
adequately evidencing that the person in possession of it is entitled
to receive, hold and dispose of the document and the goods it covers.
To be a document of title a document must purport to be issued
by or addressed to a bailee and purport to cover goods in the
bailee's possession which are either identified or are fungible por-
tions of an identified mass." This is substantially the same defini-
tion used in the Uniform Sales Act and in Omo REV. CODE § 1315.-
01 (F), but it has been rephrased so as to include new types of
documents which may develop, such as those which in air transport
may eventually supersede the bill of lading.
"Instruments" are defined in the Code § 9-105 (1) (g) as "a ne-
gotiable instrument (defined in § 3-104), or a security (defined in
§ 8-102) or any other writing not itself a security agreement or lease
which evidences a right to the payment of money and is of a type
which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery."
The Code excludes from its definition of an instrument the group
of papers arising from a transaction if they include not only a
negotiable note but also a chattel mortgage or conditional sales
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agreement. That Ohio law seems to be moving toward this same
conclusion has already been noted in the earlier paper on Article
9.2 A recent illustrative case is Conner v. Light & Furniture Co.,3
where on procedural grounds a municipal court judgment was af-
firmed which rescinded a sale and refused judgment on a note
although the note and mortgage had been negotiated to a finance
company.4
"Goods," as defined in Article 9, has substantially the same
meaning as "chattels personal" would have to an Ohio lawyer. The
test is movability at the time the security interest attaches. The
definition expressly includes unborn young of animals, growing
crops and presently movable things even though they are later
affixed to realty.5 The definition expressly excludes money, docu-
ments of title, instruments, accounts, chattel paper, contract rights
and other things in action. Although this concept of goods fits
rather easily into an Ohio lawyer's outline of property, the sub-
classifications of the concept used by Article 9 are new. Because
important differences in legal consequence result from how a
particular item of goods is subclassified, these new subclassifica-
tions as stated by Code § 9-109 will be quoted in full:
"Goods are
(1) 'consumer goods' if they are used or bought for
use primarily for personal, family or household purposes;
(2) 'equipment' if they are used or bought for use
primarily in business (including farming or a profession)
or by a debtor who is a non-profit organization or a gov-
ernmental subdivision or agency or if the goods are not in-
cluded in the definition of inventory, farm products or con-
sumer goods;
(3) 'farm products' if they are crops or livestock used
or produced in farming operations or if they are products
of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states (such
as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and eggs),
and if they are in the possession of a debtor from whose
raising, fattening, grazing or other farming operations they
derive or in which they are used. If goods are farm prod-
ucts they are neither equipment nor inventory;
(4) 'inventory' if they are held or are being prepared
for sale or are to be furnished under a contract of service
or if they are raw materials, work in process or materials
used or consumed in a business. If goods are inventory
they are neither farm products nor equipment."
Ohio statutes and case law, as the next section of this paper
214 OnIo ST. L. J. at 89 (1953).
3 94 Ohio App. 385 (1953).
4 See Amodio and Howard, Finance Company as a Holder in Due Course,
28 NOTRE DAr LAw 251 (1953); Note -Finance Company as Holder in Due
Course, 20 U. oF CIN. L. REv. 123 (1951).
s U.C.C. § 9-105 (1) (f).
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will illustrate, do presently recognize some distinctions in legal
consequence dependent upon the nature and use of the goods. For
example, household goods require special treatment under the
chattel mortgage statute and only imports or readily marketable
staples can be financed by trust receipts. There is no systematic
subclassification, however, and formal differences in legal docu-
ments are usually more significant than differences in the use or
in the physical nature of the goods.
SECURITY INTERESTS IN DOCUMENTS OF TITLE,
INSTRUMENTS AND GOODS UNDER EXISTING OHIO LAW
Ohio lawyers at present have at least ten common law and
statutory devices for creating chattel liens for commercial security
reasons. Pledge, consignment, bailment lease and field warehouse
are based on common law principles. Chattel mortgage, conditional
sale, factor's lien, trust receipt, crop mortgage and railroad equip-
ment mortgage are expressly covered by Ohio statutes. Some of
these devices overlap so that in some transactions the draftsman
has his choice of forms; and some transactions which are possible
in other states can be brought within none of the Ohio devices.
Each has its special formalities and its different procedures and
legal consequences, but none has a comprehensive set of rules cov-
ering such contemporary problems of chattel security as future
advances, after-acquired property and attachment to real estate.
Therefore the Ohio draftsman will be troubled by problems not
covered by statute or case law for the particular device he has
selected unless the transaction is an extremely simple one. In at-
tacking a security arrangement, the claim is usually made that the
wrong device was used or that some minor detail of the formal
procedure was omitted. A brief review of these various devices
will provide a background against which to contrast the innova-
tions proposed by Article 9.
(1) Pledge. Except for the requirements of the Small Loan
Act6 and pawnbroker regulations, Ohio retains the common law
of possessory pledges, and this is the normal method of obtaining
a security interest in documents of title, instruments and smaller
valuable tangible chattels.
(2) Field Warehouse. The field warehouse is a variation of
the possessory pledge." It introduces a fictional warehouseman in
order to make use of the warehouse receipt pledge provisions of
6 Orao REV. CODE § 132L01 et. seq.
7 Omo REV. CoDE § 4727.01 et seq.
8 See Note, 19 Ohio Op. 220 (1941); FRrmum, FIELD WAREHOUSmG, 42
CoL. L. REV. 991 (1942); JAcoBY Am SAuNmN=, FMIANcmG INvENTOY ON Fmxu
WAMMOUSE REcEIPTs (1944).
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the Warehouse Receipts Act.9 The field warehouse company for a
nominal rental leases space from the borrower on the borrower's
premises and usually hires the borrower's warehousing foremen
to act as the field warehouseman's agent.' 0 The borrower then
turns over possession of the property in the leased space to the
field warehouseman's agent. The field warehouse company, being
in possession of the goods, now issues for them a warehouse re-
ceipt which can be used as collateral for a loan. This device permits
a lender to maintain a lien on a constantly changing inventory by
releasing goods only against payment and lending to pay for goods
as deposited in the field warehouse.
(3) Bailment Lease. The chattel lease with option to buy is
substituted for the chattel mortgage or conditional sale for various
reasons. Perhaps the most frequent reason is that the lessee hopes
to deduct his payments as rent in calculating his income tax rather
than to show a purchase of a capital asset with subsequent depre-
ciation of the cost. The lessee may also hope to avoid personal
property tax by not taking title or may hope to avoid showing a
liability on his balance sheet for the unpaid portion of the purchase
price. Bailment leases are often attacked as disguised conditional
sales which should have been recorded. The Code reduces but will
not entirely eliminate the uncertainty. At Code § 9-102 (2) it is ap-
plied to "a lease intended as security."
OHIo REV. CODE § 1335.03 must also be considered in connec-
tion with bailment leases. This statute provides that when "goods
and chattels remain for five years in the possession of a person...
to whom a pretended loan thereof has been made, such goods and
chattels become the property of such person, unless..." a docu-
ment is filed reserving title. This statute has been construed by the
Ohio Supreme Court so as to permit a bailee to retain dies held
by him for more than five years after having been originally pro-
vided in connection with a contract to supply work done with the
dies." The situation in the case the Ohio Supreme Court decided
was sufficiently like a bailment for hire that some bailment lessee
or bailee for hire may well try to use Onto REv. CODE § 1335.03 as
a defense.' 2
(4) Consignment. "Memo billing," whereby a retailer is sup-
9 Omo P~v. CoDE § 1323.01 et seq.
10 A sublease to a field warehouseman does not violate a covenant against
subleasing. Mercury Electronic Laboratories v. Krug, 330 Ill. App. 336, 71
N.E. 2d 104 (1947). A field warehouse employee is not in interstate com-
merce although stationed at a company engaged in interstate commerce.
Walling v. Mutual Wholesale Food & Supply Co., 141 F. 2d 331 (1944).
11 Richter & Phillips Co. v. Queen City Mfg., 156 Ohio St. 143 (1951).12 See Note, Fraudulent Conveyances- Loans of Chattels - Recording of
Loans, 21 U. or Cnm. LAw Rv. 308 (1952).
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plied with an inventory by a wholesaler and, in theory at least,
purchases from the wholesaler as he makes each retail sale, is
frequently used in Ohio. If all relevant papers are carefully drafted
and if the parties meticulously observe the consignor-consignee
relationship, the title of the consignor will be upheld. The difficulty
lies in the fact that the parties frequently transform the relation-
ship into a debtor-creditor one by their book entries, invoices and
treatment of proceeds. Ohio authority is scanty but one case does
hold that a bailment rather than a conditional sale is created by a
carefully drawn consignment contract, at least when there is no
issue raised as to whether the parties in practice observed the
provisions of the contract.' 3 The consignee is not liable for Ohio
personal property tax on consigned merchandise.' 4
(5) Chattel Mortgage. Omo REv. CODE §§ 1319.01 to 1319.10,
inclusive, covers chattel mortgages. A chattel mortgage must be
filed "forthwith" after delivery of possession to the mortgagor. The
filing is made with the county recorder of the county where the
mortgagor resides at the time of the execution of the mortgage. If
the mortgagor resides outside Ohio, the filing is made with the
recorder of the county in which the mortgaged property is located.
Mortgages upon both real and personal property may be indexed
as chattel mortgages but recorded and indexed as real estate
mortgages also. There are two principal formalities required -the
mortgagee's sworn statement and the joint consent of husband
and wife to the mortgaging of household goods. If the mortgage is
to secure a money debt, the mortgagee must under oath state
"the amount of the claim and that it is just and unpaid." If the
mortgage is to indemnify a surety against liability, the sworn state-
ment must state "the liability and that the instrument was taken
in good faith to indemnify against loss that may result therefrom."
Except when the chattel mortgage is given to secure the original
purchase price, an effective lien cannot be created upon "personal
household property" of a married person unless both the husband
and wife execute the mortgage.
There are several restrictions on a mortgagee's rights in the
event of default. Repossession prior to foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage in a court of record will eliminate any right to a de-
ficiency judgment unless a 10-day notice is given the mortgagor
of the time and place of sale, the minimum price which will be
accepted, and a notice that the mortgagor will be held liable for
any deficiency.' 5 "Necessary household goods, wearing apparel, or
13 See, R. Carillo & Co. v. McAfee Bros. Furn. Co., 42 Ohio App. 259 (1932).
14 OuIO DEuTmErs or TAXATION, Rule 208 (1941).
IS See Restrictions on Deficiency Judgment where Chattel Mortgagee Re-
possesses Property Without Order of Court, 10 Omo ST. L. J. 470 (1949).
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mechanic's tools of a person or family" cannot be seized prior to
foreclosure and the mortgagee will have the court costs adjudged
against him unless he recovers the full amount of his petition.
These restrictions, however, do not apply "to the sale of furniture
or other household goods by regular dealers."' 6
A recorded chattel mortgage on a stock of merchandise is
valid against lien creditors if the mortgagor sells the inventory
as a bona fide agent of the mortgagee and accounts to the mortgagee
for the proceeds of the sale. If the mortgagor retains the power of
sale for his own benefit and need not account to the mortgagee
for the proceeds of sale, however, the mortgage is good betveen
the parties but void as to lien creditors. The legal theory is that a
chattel mortgage granted only with the reservation that the mort-
gagor may sell the collateral for his own benefit is fraudulent."
The mortgagee of such a fraudulent mortgage can, however, perfect
his interest against lien creditors by taking possession of the col-
lateral either with the consent of the mortgagor at such time or
under an authorization contained in the mortgage.'8 A chattel
mortgage is not valid as to after-acquired property or replacement
merchandise until the mortgagee obtains possession of the col-
lateral.
(6) Conditional Sales. OHo REV. CoDE §§ 1319.11 to 1319.16,
inclusive, covers conditional sales. (The trust receipt provisions
are also included in § 1319.11.) The draftsmen of OHIo REV. CoDE
§ 1319.11 attempted to cover all forms of conditional sales includ-
ing ones disguised as leases, and the courts have generally ap-
plied the statute to such disguised sales.19 The formal requirements
of a conditional sales agreement good against creditors are a writ-
ten agreement executed by the purchaser, a statement thereon
under oath by the seller of the amount of the claim, and the re-
cording of the original or of a copy with an affidavit that it is a
true copy. The recording is with the recorder of the county where
the buyer resides or if he resides outside of Ohio, of the county
where the property is situated. Conditional sales are little used in
part because finance companies and banks prefer to finance on
chattel mortgages so that they need not in theory become condi-
16 See Karlinger, Chattel Mortgages as Security, 23 Omo BAn 353 (1950);
Meredith, Installment Sales Under The Metzenbaum Act, 23 OMo BAR 357
(1950).17 See Note-Rights Under The Ohio Law of a Mortgagee of a Chattel
Who Has Allowed The Mortgagor to Remain in Possession of the Mortgaged
Property With a Power of Sale, 7 U. or CIR. L. REv. 315 (1933).18 Francisco v. Ryan, 54 Ohio St. 307 (1896).
19 Unitype Co. v. Long, 143 Fed. 315 (1906); In re Printing Co. Bankrupt, 3
OHmo T. RE. 137 (1905).
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tional sellers.20 A more important reason for preferring chattel
mortgages is the refund-prior-to-repossession provision of OMo
REV. CODE § 1319.14. That section prohibits repossession unless the
seller tenders to the buyer a refund of the money paid minus "a
reasonable compensation for the use of such property, which in no
case shall exceed 50% of the amount paid." No refund is required
if it would be less than 25% of the purchase price. These refund
provisions do not apply to machinery and equipment for railroads,
contracting, quarrying, mining and brick, cement and tile manu-
facturing. They also do not apply, since 1951, to property having
a contract price of $5,000.00 or more. Since this 1951 amendment,
conditional sale financing of heavy equipment has been more fre-
quently used.
(7) Factor's Lien. Under the common law, the merchant
factor's lien is asserted by a sales agent against property of his
principal in the sales agent's possession. It is a possessory lien
limited to amounts due to the sales agent for advances, commis-
sions and expenses due him from the principal. Although this
common law lien has been preserved in Ohio,2' changing business
methods have made it unimportant and it has only a remote his-
torical relationship to the statutory factor's lien.
22
The first step in the creation of a statutory factor's lien under
OHIO REV. CODE § 1311.59 et seq. is the execution by the borrower
and the factor of a written agreement which provides that the
factor is to have a lien upon merchandise owned by the borrower.
The agreement neither need specifically describe the merchandise
covered nor is it necessary that such merchandise be in existence
at the time the agreement is made. The agreement should provide
that the merchandise which will be covered by the lien shall from
time to time be identified in separate written statements dated and
executed by the borrower and delivered to the factor. These writ-
ten statements in practice usually are copies of the invoices, in-
ventory cards or other operating documents. Within fifteen days
after the execution of this written agreement a public notice of the
agreement signed by both parties to it must be filed in the county
in which the borrower's principal place of business is located.
The factor's lien is deemed to have been perfected and is valid,
as of the date of duly filing the said notice, against unsecured
creditors of the borrower and against unsecured liens of creditors.
The lien as to each of the various items of merchandise exists when
the separate written statement covering that item is delivered to
20 See Karlinger, Chattel Mortgages as Security, 23 OHio BAR 353, 354
(1950).2 1Omo REV. Coar § 1311.64.
22 See Cameron, Factors' Liens in Ohio, 23 Omo BAR 361 (1950).
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the factor. The general exception to the foregoing is that specific
liens arising out of contractual acts of the borrower with reference
to the processing, warehousing, shipping or otherwise dealing with
the merchandise in the usual course of the borrower's business
preparatory to its sale, are superior to the lien of the factor on the
merchandise. Thus, a factor might have a lien on cotton fabric
which, once placed in the hands of a dyer by the borrower, would
be subject to a superior possessory lien of the dyer for work done.
The statute also provides that merchandise subject to a factor's
lien may be sold in the ordinary course of the borrower's business
free from the factor's lien, whether or not the purchaser has knowl-
edge of the existence of such lien.
The Ohio Factor's Lien Act has been substantially clarified
in the process of code revision, but it is still not an entirely satis-
factory inventory financing device. 23 There are many procedural
questions which trouble the draftsman. Does OHIo REV. CODE
§ 1311.63 permit only a first extension of the term of the notice,
or may it be repeatedly extended? Must a new written statement
be delivered to the financier after goods have been processed, or
will a statement covering steel tubing suffice for assembled bi-
cycles? How can the lien be preserved against the accounts re-
ceivable which arise from the sale of the inventory? How much
description is required in the written statements? Despite these
questions, the statutory factor's lien is the most satisfactory in-
ventory financing device available in Ohio.24
(8) Trust Receipt. There is no substantial amount of trust
receipt financing in Ohio because of the unsatisfactory state of the
Ohio law on this subject. The statute is cryptic, and the decisions
have severely restricted its application. Indeed, the Ohio law of
trust receipts is incomprehensible until its history is reviewed.
Trust receipts were developed to finance importations. In
simplest form, a local dealer or manufacturer wants to buy goods
on credit from a foreign seller. The local bank pays the foreign
seller, and the seller conveys a security title to the bank and ships
the physical goods to the local dealer or manufacturer. Before the
local dealer or manufacturer obtains possession of the goods he
executes a trust receipt to the bank. Although this was by then a
well established, financing device for both foreign and domestic
transactions, in 1918 a trust receipt transaction was construed to
be a conditional sale and held invalid for failure to record under
the Ohio Conditional Sales Act.25
23 See Ogline, The Factors' Lien Act as a Method of Inventory Financing,
4 WEsT. R s. LAw R v. 336 (1953).
24 See Cameron, supra, note 22, at p. 363.
2S In re Bettman-Johnson Co., 250 Fed. 657 (6th Cir. 1918).
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To overrule the 1918 case, the Ohio statute on conditional sales
was amended in 1925. It provides that it should not "apply to, or
... require the deposit, filing or other record of trust receipts...
for: (A) Any goods or merchandise imported from without the
United States... (B) A readily marketable staple wherever pur-
chased...."26 The statute does require, however, that the parties
record a general agreement between them as to trust receipt fi-
nancing. This last provision is generally regarded as the first use
of notice filing (i.e., public recordation of a general statement that
some assets of a particular creditor may be subject to lien rather
than public recordation of the particular lien applicable to each
particular asset). Carried into the Uniform Trust Receipts Act,
notice filing has been adopted in many states and has been copied
from the Uniform Trust Receipts Act as one of the important con-
cepts of Article 9.
In Ohio, however, the statute has never been well understood
by the courts. In Central Acceptance Corp. v. Lynch,27 automobiles
were held not to be "readily marketable staples" and hence not
appropriate objects for trust receipt financing. Prior to the Certifi-
cate of Title law of 1938,28 which provides for financing dealer
stocks, the automobile industry adjusted to the Central Acceptance
case by recording trust receipts as conditional sales. 29 Even if the
Code is not adopted, Ohio might well consider adopting the Uni-
form Trust Receipts Act.3 0
(9) Crop Mortgage. By special statute,31 Ohio farmers can
make a valid mortgage on crops (including fruits, nuts, berries,
flowers, etc.) "either planted or to be planted within one year
from the date of the execution of such mortgage or any extension
thereof." The mortgage must secure a loan for crop production
purposes and the loan must be obtained from various Federally
approved agencies under the Farm Credits Act of 1933.
(10) Railroad Equipment Mortgage. Omo REV. CODE § 1701.-
82 solves two difficult problems in the financing of railroad rolling
stock-the problem of the transitory nature of the collateral and
the problem that replacement cars are often substituted for the
original collateral. It provides an optional filing in the office of
the Secretary of State which "shall have the same effect, as to the
lien created thereby on such rolling stock, movable equipment or
26 0Hio REv. CoDE § 1319.11.
2758 F. 2d 915 (6th Cir. 1932).
28 Omo REv. CODE § 4505.01 et seq.
29 In re Collingwood Motor Sales, 72 F. 2d 137 (6th Cir. 1934).
3oSee Recent Decision, SaZes-Trust Receipts- Bankruptcy, 9 0mro ST.
L. J. 708-10 (1948). Also see Hanna, Trust Receipts, 19 CAnw. L. REv. 257
(1931) and 168 AL.R 359 (1947).
31 OHIo REV. CODE §§ 1319.09 and .10.
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machines, as though filed in the office of the recorder of each
county in which such rolling stock, movable equipment, or ma-
chines are situated or employed." The statute also makes express
provision for the creation of a lien upon after-acquired property.
TRANSACTIONS COVERED BY THE CODE
There are certain security transactions involving documents
of title, instruments and goods which are specifically excluded
from the application of Article 9. For example, security interests
in vessels to the extent subject to the Ship Mortgage Act of 192032
are excluded, as are other security interests which are subject to
a "statute of the United States to the extent that such statute
regulates the rights of parties to and third parties affected by
transactions in particular types of property."33 Airplanes illustrate
a rather unusual provision of the Code. The Civil Aeronautics
Act 34 provides a national registration system for liens on aircraft
but does not regulate the rights of parties. Code § 9-104 (a), there-
fore, does not exclude aircraft from Article 9, but Code § 9-302 (2)
does permit the Federal aircraft lien filing to serve as a substitute
for Article 9 filing.3 5
"A landlord's lien" is also excluded from the application of
Article 9.36 The intention here is to exclude the statutory lien in
the nature of distraint which some states (but not Ohio) give to
the landlord on the personal property of his tenant. The contractual
lien sometimes used in Ohio leases should not be regarded as ex-
cluded from Article 9.37 Equipment trusts covering railway rolling
stock are excluded, 38 but equipment trusts on other property (e.g.
contractor's equipment) are covered as are security interests in
railway rolling stock other than by way of equipment trusts. As-
signments or other transfers of interests or claims in or under
insurance policies are also excluded.3 9
The various statutory and common law service and material
liens are expressly excluded from Article 9,40 and the Code pro-
vides that such liens shall take priority over the Article 9 security
interest "unless the lien is statutory and the statute expressly pro-
32 46 U.S.C. § 911 ff.
33 U.C.C. § 9-104(a).
34 49 U.S.C. § 523.
3S Compare 1943 O.A.G. No. 6061 stating that a chattel mortgage on an
airplane should be filed with the county recorder.
36U.C.C. § 9-104(b).
37 Compare Smith v. Waman, 19 Ohio St. 145 (1870), holding that a lease
must be filed as a chattel mortgage to give landlord a lien on tenant's chat-
tels valid as against lien creditors.
38U.C.C. § 9-104(e).
39U.C.C. § 9-104 (g).
40U.C.C. § 9-104(c).
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vides otherwise." 41 Ohio statutory chattel liens include a lien for
the care of animals; 42 an unpaid seller's lien;43 warehousemen's
lien;44 common carrier's lien;45 coal miner's lien; 46 a lien upon the
get of stallions and bulls for service in breeding;47 and a watercraft
lien.48 In Good v. Meyer and Mendoza,49 it was implied that a chat-
tel mortgagee's lien could prevail over a warehousemen's lien,
and the general Ohio rule is that a chattel mortgage duly recorded
takes priority over the lien of a mechanic for services subsequently
performed in the repair of the chattel. 0 OHIo REV. CODE § 1311.52
perhaps reverses the Good case rule as to warehousemen's liens,
and in Provost v. Wilcox,51 the lien of creditors who had outfitted
a vessel was held superior to a ship mortgage in order that the
mortgagee not be unjustly enriched at the cost of those who had
enhanced the value of the property. The writers prefer the rule
Ohio uses for watercraft and the policy of the Code of favoring
liens arising from work intended to enhance or preserve the value
of the collateral even over an earlier security interest which has
been perfected, but the present Ohio rule as to chattel repair
liens can easily be preserved by statutory provision.
Consignments are brought under Article 9 by a provision of
the Sales Article which provides:
"Where the buyer has a place of business at which he
deals in goods of the kind involved, such words as 'on con-
signment' or 'on memorandum' or other words purporting
to reserve title to the seller until payment or resale are
insufficient as against the buyer's creditors to keep the
transaction from being a sale or return unless the seller
complies with any applicable law requiring a consignor's
interest or the like to be evidenced by a sign or establishes
that the buyer is known to be primarily engaged in selling
the goods of others or complies with the filing provisions
of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9)."52
Ohio does not have a selling factor's act with a sign provision as
41 U.C.C. § 9-310.
42 OHIo REV. CODE §§ 1311.48 and .49.
43 OHIo REV. CODE § § 1315.55 to .57.
44 OHIo REV. CODE § § 1323.27 to .36.
4 5 OHIO REv. CODE § § 4965.23 and .24.
46 OHIO REV. CODE § 1311.25.
4 7 OHIo Rv. CODE § § 1311.50 and .51.
4 8 OHo REv. CODE § 4585.01 et seq.
49 22 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 353, 31 Ohio Dec. 305 (affirmed by court of ap-
peals); motion to certify record overruled, 18 Ohio L. Rep. 45, 65 Bull. 217
(1920).
50 Securities Co. v. Orlow, 107 Ohio St 583 (1923); Cleve. Auto Top &
Trim Co. v. Am. Finance Co., 124 Ohio St. 169 (1931); Bank v. Kerland, 31
Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 385 (1934).
5117 Ohio 359 (1849).
52 U.C.C. § 2-326(2).
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do many other states.5 3 Under the Code, therefore, all consignments
except to such establishments as auction centers would be under
Article 9. This would be preferable to the present uncertain status
of the consignment in Ohio.
The conflict of laws provisions of the Code are well thought
out for the current commercial situation. Collateral has become
easily transportable across state lines and security transactions
often involve parties in several states. Ohio presently forbids the
removal of personal property with intent to defraud from the coun-
ty where it was situated at the time it was mortgaged, but this
type of criminal statute is wholly inadequate for the commercial
needs of today.54
The Code begins with the rule that Article 9 applies to goods,
documents of title and instruments if such collateral is "within
the jurisdiction of this state."5 5 The official comments to the Code
interpret this as equivalent to "physically located in this state."
This is probably the present Ohio rule,50 and if generally adopted
by the various states would resolve the problem of complying with
the requirements of several states in transactions with contacts in
several states. There are several important exceptions in the Code
to this general rule. If the property was outside State A and the
parties understood at the time the security interest was agreed upon
that the property would be kept in State A and it was brought
there within thirty days, then the law of State A governs.57 Ohio
case law is in substantial agreement on this principle though, of
course, no specific number of days is provided.58
Property brought into the state subject to a security interest
under the Code remains subject to the original security interest for
four months.5 9 If a local filing is made during the four months, the
security interest remains effective and dates from its original per-
fection outside the state. If the local filing is made after four months
or if the security interest was not perfected elsewhere, the security
interest dates from the local filing. Ohio law presently recognizes
security interests perfected in other states only when the property
is brought into Ohio without the knowledge or consent of the lien
holder.60 The Code provisions are based on the Uniform Condi-
53 See e.g., N. Y. PEs. PRop. LAw § 45.
54 See Orno REV. CoDE §§ 1319.17, 1319.18, and 1319.99.
55 U.C.C. § 9-102.
s56 Boyer v. M. D. Knowlton Co. 85 Ohio St. 104 (1911).
57 U.C.a § 9-103(3).
5 Boyer v. AL D. Knowlton Co., 85 Ohio St. 104 (1911); E. I. duPont de
Nemours Powder Co. v. Jones Bros., 200 Fed. 638 (1912); Potter Mg. Co. v.
Arthur, 220 Fed. 843 (1915); and In re Pickett, 37 Ohio L. Rep. 153 (Fed. 1932).
59 U.C.C. § 9-103 (3).60 Universal Credit Co. v. Reising, 32 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 486 (afirmed, 50
Ohio App. 289) (1935); Kanoga v. Taylor, 7 Ohio St. 134 (1858).
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tional Sales Act (not adopted in Ohio) which require a conditional
seller to file within ten days after he "received notice" that the
goods had been removed to another state. By making the period
long enough for a reasonably vigilant lien holder to have learned
that the goods have been removed from the original state and to
have completed a search for them in other states, the Code can
use an objective rather than a subjective test. It seems to be a
workable one.
The test for the mobile equipment normally used in several
states is the "chief place of business" of the debtor.6 ' Thus for
road building equipment, construction machinery, airplanes and
the like it will no longer be necessary for the secured party to file
in each filing district where the equipment might be used. The
special treatment of some of this equipment under the Ohio con-
ditional sales act reflects the business need of safe financing of
such chattels. The Code's rule seems sound, although some might
prefer the definite situs of the debtor's place of incorporation rather
than the less definite situs of "chief place of business" which the
official comments describe as "the place from which in fact the
debtor manages the main part of his business operations."
A final point on the conflict of laws rules of the Code is that
the permission given by Code § 1-105 (6) for parties to select the
controlling law is limited by Code § 1-102 (3) (b) which would not
permit the parties to agree upon a controlling law which would
adversely affect the interests of third parties. The debtor and se-
cured party cannot, therefore, stipulate that their transaction shall
not be governed by Article 9 if that would be a detriment to the
rights of anyone who might have expected Article 9 to govern.6 2
SECURITY INTERESTS IN DOCUMENTS OF TITLE, INSTRU-
MENTS AND GOODS UNDER THE COMMERCIAL CODE
The Code establishes a single procedure for the creation, at-
tachment, perfection and enforcement of security interests. In
some classifications of property a security interest can be created
without going through the entire procedure, but the formal re-
quirements are reduced to a bare minimum and, if required at all,
they are the same for all property. This will mean that under the
Code litigation in Ohio attacking the validity of security interests
will turn on new issues. The familiar technical grounds of attack
against a claimant seeking to assert a secured position are: He
61 U.C.C. § 9-103(2).
62 See Goodrich, Conflicts, Niceties, and Commercial Necessities, 1952 Wis.
L. REv. 199 (1952) for general discussion of conflict of laws under the Code.
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used the wrong form. 63 Even though the objector knew about the
filing, claimant filed in the wrong place. 64 The information filed by
claimant was reasonably adequate but not technically complete.0 5
Claimant's sworn statement said the chattel mortgage was "for value
received" and " in good faith" but it did not use the statutory
wording of "just and unpaid."003 His sworn statement was that the
mortgage was "just and unpaid" but it did not use the statutory
wording for an indemnitor that the mortgage was "taken in good
faith.6 7 His affidavit was incomplete and it cannot be aided by
statements in the mortgage because the affidavit did not incorpor-
ate them by reference.68 Claimant did not inscribe his affidavit
"thereon" but used a separate sheet attached to the contract of
sale. 9 Claimant did not adequately describe the mortgaged prop-
erty.70
Under the Code, issues such as above listed, all of them tech-
nical and many of them trivial, will not arise since under the Code
a security interest is created by a simple agreement between the
secured party and the debtor 71 and the only formal requirements
are:
(a) It must be in writing unless the collateral is in the
possession of the secured party.72
(b) It must describe the collateral and must also describe
the land if the collateral is crops or is oil, gas or min-
63 Trust & Savings Bank v. Devlin, 6 F. 2d 518 (1925). (Trust receipt
treated as an unfiled chattel mortgage.); Yurcisin v. Commercial Credit Co.,
67 Ohio App. 513 (1940). (Chattel mortgage treated as improperly filed con-
ditional sale.); Bettman-Johnson, 250 Fed. 657 (1918). (Trust receipt treated
as unfiled conditional sale.); In re Pickett, 37 Ohio L. Rep. 153 Fed. 1932.
(Farm machinery lease with option to purchase at end of term for $1 treated as
unfiled conditional sale.)
64 Houk v. Condon, 40 Ohio St. 569 (1884). (Judgment creditor may levy
and obtain prior lien even though he knew of misfiled chattel mortgage.), but
cf. Toledo Pulp Plaster Co. v. Chambers, 11 Ohio App. 176 (1919).
6 S Osborn Co. v. Wells, 69 Fed. (2d) 970 (1934). (Name of mortgagor con-
tained name of city but not repeated as location in the chattel mortgage form.)
66 Schuster v. Wendling, 116 F. 2d 596 (1941).
67 Nesbit v. Worts. 37 Ohio St. 378 (1881).
68 Blandy v. Benedict, 42 Ohio St. 295 (1884).
69 National Cash Register Co. v. Closs, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 15 (1908);
Columbus Mdse. Co. v. Kline, 15 Ohio L. Rep. 525 (1917). (Separate sheet
glued to the conditional sales agreement would suffice but not if attached
merely by brass fasteners.) Also see Merchandise Co. v. Kline, 248 Fed. 296
(1917); In re Chinese Temple Restaurant Co., 54 F.2d 945, 946 (1931). (Af-
fidavit on separate sheet attached by two wire staples does not suffice.)
70 In re Rice, 18 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 489 (1914). (A schedule of property
covered must be attached to the chattel mortgage and marked as an exhibit.
Reference to it is not sufficient.)
71 U.C.C. § 9-201.
72 U.C.. § 9-203 (1) (a).
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erals to be extracted from the land. The description
is sufficient "whether or not it is specific if it reason-
ably identifies the thing described." 73
(c) It must be signed by the debtor.74
The technical requirements of some of the present Ohio chattel
lien laws of acknowledgment, accompanying affidavits, etc., are
abandoned. Since the evidentiary purposes of (a) clearly estab-
lishing the existence of the security interest at a time prior to the
debtor's insolvency, and (b) identifying the property covered are
met by the secured party's possession of the collateral or by his
filing of the written agreement, the Code's simplified form meets
the real needs of a public-notice-prior-to-insolvency system.
As is true under present Ohio law, under the Code the security
agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties
despite formal defects and despite failure to file.75 Likewise both
Ohio law and the Code permit the unfiled chattel security interest
to prevail over general creditors who have not obtained a lien on
the collateral.76 In bankruptcy, however, in the contest between the
trustee and the holder of an unfiled chattel security interest the
trustee will prevail under present Ohio law or under the Code
even though he represents general creditors, because the Bank-
ruptcy Act gives him the status of a lien creditor.77 A security
agreement is, of course, subject to laws and regulations governing
usury, small loans, retail installment sales or the like.78
As against persons not parties to the security agreement such
as purchasers of the collateral and creditors, the rules established
by the Code are somewhat complicated. They are no more compli-
cated, however, than the thicket of present Ohio statutes and case
law, and, when analyzed, the rules of the Code form a coherent
pattern, which cannot be said of the present Ohio law. There are
four technical terms used in the Code which must be understood
as a preliminary to working out the pattern of the Code. These
are the words "create," "attach," "perfect" and "enforce."
A security interest is 'created" by a simple agreement be-
73 U.C.C. § § 9-.10 and -203.
74 U.C.C. § 9-203.
75 U.C.C. § 9-201, York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U.S. 344 (1906) (as be-
tween the parties to a conditional sale, filing for record is not necessary);
Doyle v. Yoho Hooker Youngstown Co., 130 Ohio St. 400 (1936); Foerstner v.
Citizens Say. etc., Co., 186 Fed. 1 (1911) (unfiled chattel mortgage is good as
between the mortgagor and mortgagee).
76 Wilson v. Leslie, 20 Ohio 161 (1852) (unfiled chattel mortgage); Sec-
ond National Bank of Hamilton v. Ohio Contract Purchase Co., 28 Ohio App.
93 (1927) (unfiled conditional sale); U.C.C. § 9-301(1).
77 11 U.S.C. § 96 (a) (2).
78 U.C.C. § 9-201.
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tween the parties, as described above. It "attaches" to the col-
lateral: 7 9
(a) when an agreement has been made that it is to attach,
(b) value has been given, and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
This security interest, having attached to the collateral, is "per-
fected," depending upon the nature of the collateral, by possession,
by filing, or without either filing or possession. Finally, it is "en-
forced" by various stated procedures.
Let us return to the subject of the attachment of a security
interest. The Code80 provides that a security interest which has
attached but which has not been perfected will prevail over a lien
creditor who knew of the existence of the unperfected security in-
terest. In short, an unperfected security interest is not absolutely
void as to all lien creditors. The Ohio chattel mortgage rule is con-
trary,81 as is the Ohio conditional sale rule.8 2 The Code, in short,
substitutes a subjective test regarding the claimant's knowledge of
the prior unperfected lien for the objective test of the present Ohio
law, namely which claimant filed first. The same difference exists
between the Code's test of priority between successive assignees
of an account receivable and the test of the present Ohio law. We
have previously expressed our conclusion in discussing that statute
that "the more strict (present Ohio) rule would avoid difficult
questions to litigate relating to subjective knowledge, but it might
occasionally produce quite inequitable results. The reasons for
choosing either policy seem less weighty than the desirability of
tampering as little as possible with the substantive sections of the
Code.' 83 It should also be noted that the Code regards an individual
creditor as a lien creditor from the time of issuance of process
which results in attachment or levy within a reasonable time there-
after.8 4 But Ohio regards an individual as a general creditor until
the personal property is seized in execution.8 5
Code § 9-204 (6) provides a security interest for a buyer who
advances funds to his seller to enable the seller to obtain or manu-
facture the goods ordered. This security interest, which attaches
79UC.C. § 9-204(1).
80U.C.C. § 9-301.
81 Houk v. Condon, 40 Ohio St. 569 (1884); The Huber Mfg. Co. v. Seveny,
57 Ohio St. 169 (1897); Capital Finance Co. v. Karp. 75 Ohio App. 210 (1945).
82 Hamilton v. David C. Beggs Co., 179 Fed. 949 (1910); Doyle v. Yoho
Hooker Youngstown Co., 130 Ohio St. 400 (1936).
83 14 Omo ST. L. J. 83 (1953).
84U.C.C. § 9-301(3).
8 5 OHro REv. CoDE § 2329.03. See Dutt v. Marion Air Conditioning Sales,
Inc., 159 Ohio St 290, 296 (1953) for validity in Ohio of a statutory lien on per-
sonal property which does not require distraint or seizure of or a levy on par-
ticular property in order to perfect the lien.
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to the goods by virtue of the contract of sale as soon as the goods
become identified to the contract, can be perfected by the buyer
and will then protect him in the event of his seller's insolvency.
As the practice of "enabling advances" has become more common
(particularly in connection with military subcontracting), some
such protection of buyers has become necessary, and it is not pro-
vided by the Uniform Sales Act.88
Code § 9-204 also provides generally that a security agreement
may provide that (a) future advances will be secured by the col-
lateral, and (b) after-acquired collateral will secure advances made
at any time under the security agreement. There are two limitations
on the after-acquired property provision. A security interest will
not attach to crops which grow more than a certain number of
years (to be determined by the legislature) after the date of the
security agreement, except where the security interest is to secure
a lease or land contract, in which event the future crops through-
out the term of the lease or land contract may be pledged.87 This
should be compared with the lien now permitted by Omo REV. CODE
§ 1319.09 on crops to be planted in one year. The second limitation
is that a security interest will not attach to after-acquired consumer
goods unless the debtor acquires them within ten days after the
secured party gives value.88 This protects the consumer field from
the use of retail credit sales agreements which would gobble up as
security for the first debt all subsequent consumer goods pur-
chased by the debtor, but it permits the commercial field to use the
after-acquired property clause to control a borrower from over-
buying and over-borrowing.
The status of future advance and after-acquired property
clauses under present Ohio law depends upon the security device
used. Ohio chattel mortgages will not provide a valid lien on after-
acquired property,8 9 and because the affidavit must state the amount
of the claim, Ohio chattel mortgages are not adaptable to secure
future advances.9 0 Under the factor's lien statute,91 the railroad
equipment statute,9 2 and by the device of field warehousing, a pro-
cedure can be developed, however, which gives the same effect as
a validation of such clauses.9 3 The Code therefore would not make
86 OHIo REV. CODE § 1315.20 (D) (1). See, e.g., Ely & Walker Dry Goods
Co. v. Adams AfMg. Co., Inc., 105 F. 2d 906 (2nd Cir. 1939) and cf., Orno
REv. CODE § 1315.76.
87 U.C.C. § 9-204 (4) (a).
88 U.C.C. § 9-204 (4) (b).
89 Chapman v. Weimer, 4 Ohio St. 481 (1855); Francisco v. Ryan, 54
Ohio St. 307 (1896).
90Hurlburt v. Bates, 90 Ohio St. 430 (1914).
91 Osio REv. CODE § 1311.60.
92 Omo REV. CODE § 170L82.
93 See 14 Ohio St. L.J. 72 ff. and 85 ff. (1953).
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possible security arrangements now barred in Ohio. It would mere-
ly extend the results now acieved at some trouble and expense
by factor's liens or field warehousing to the general commercial
financing exclusive of retail consumer credit financing. We have
previously pointed out on this point" that retention of old law as a
resistance to the expansion of current asset financing does not
really block the expansion. It merely makes such financing complex
and expensive.
We turn now to the perfection of security interests which have
attached to documents of title, instruments or goods. The general
rule is that a security interest is perfected by the filing of the se-
curity agreement (if it is signed by the secured party as well as
the debtor) or of a financing statement. The latter consists of a
paper signed by the secured party and the debtor containing their
mailing addresses and indicating the types, or describing the items,
of property covered.95 This notice is substantially the same as the
one Ohio presently requires for the assignment of accounts re-
ceivable"0 or for a factor's lien.97 The whole idea of notice filing
derives from the 1925 Ohio statute providing for the trust receipt
affidavit.9 8 The chattel mortgage or conditional sale with all of its
greater detail actually serves only as a notice since the amount
due invariably will have changed and further inquiry of the parties
will be necessary to learn the current status of the indebtedness.
Our discussion of the various exceptions to the general rule
of perfection by filing necessarily will be interlaced with a dis-
cussion of the various exceptions to the general rule that a per-
fected security interest prevails over all third parties. Such a
combined discussion cannot be both brief and accurate. The fol-
lowing general comments must therefore be regarded as illustrative
of the Code's farmework and not as precise. The comments will
cover four situations.
(1) The Unperfected Security Interest. We have already point-
ed out the Code's subjective test which subordinates to an un-
perfected security interest the claim of anyone who actually has
knowledge of such interest. The unperfected interest will also
prevail over the claims of buyers not in the ordinary course of
business, including bulk transferees, who do not obtain delivery
of the collateral.9 9 The secured party who has a purchase money
security interest and who files within ten days after giving value
will prevail over a lien creditor who attached or levied during the
9414 Ohio St. L.J. 73 (1953).
95 UC.C. § 9-402.9 6 Omo Pbv. CODE § 1325.01.
97 Omo REV. CODE § 1311.61.
98 Now OHo REV. CODE § 1319.11.
99 U.C.C. § 9-301 (1).
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ten days, and over a bulk purchaser. This ten-day grace period
does not protect against a buyer in due course or a competing
secured party who perfects during the ten days. °0 0 These provisions
seem a fair compromise between the time needed for orderly busi-
ness and the race to the recorder's office.
(2) The Security Interest Which Becomes Perfected Upon
Attachment. A purchase money security interest in consumer goods
becomes perfected without filing as does such an interest in farm
equipment having a purchase price not in excess of $2,500.00.101 (If
the consumer goods or farm equipment is part of the realty, then
filing is required per Code § 9-313, and if it is a motor vehicle
Article 9 does not apply at all.) Such perfected interest is superior
to the claims of creditors, pledgees and mortgagees but is sub-
ordinate to the claim of a buyer without knowledge of the unfiled
security interest who gives value and buys for his own personal,
family or household purposes or his own farming operations. 0 2 This
of course, is a substantial change from present Ohio law but not
from Ohio practice as to consumer goods. Most Ohio stores do not
file consumer purchase money chattel mortgages because the cost
and time they save by not filing such liens provide an adequate
reserve against loss of a secured position in a consumer bankruptcy.
Since under the Code a secured party may file if he wishes on
consumer goods or farm equipment costing under $2,500.00, an oc-
casional purchaser from a consumer who neglects to check the
records may lose out to a secured party. The same result would
obtain under present Ohio law.
As to instruments and documents, the Code provides that for
the first 21 days after the security interest attaches it shall be
perfected as against all but holders in due course. 03 After the 21-
day period, the secured party must obtain possession since filing
will not perfect a security interest in instruments and documents. 0 4
Once the secured party has had possession of the instruments or
documents he may return such collateral to the debtor and retain
his perfected security interest for 21 days against all but holders
in due course. This protects the secured party in many legitimate
situations where he must leave the debtor temporarily in possession
of pledged intangibles. For example, the debtor may require the
securities for transfer on the issuer's books, to obtain goods covered
by a document, etc. The general pattern of this Code provision is
derived from the common law pledge theory of a return for tempor-
100 U.C.C. § 9-301(2).
101 U.C.C. § 9-302 (1).
102 U.C.C. § 9-307 (2).
103 U.C.C. § 9-304 and-309.
104 U.C.C. § 9-303 (3).
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ary and limited use as carried into some of the trust receipts
acts'0 5 and factor's lien acts. 10 6 It seems to be a useful provision.
(3) The Security Interest Which Becomes Perfected By Pos-
session of the Secured Party. When goods, instruments or docu-
ments come into the possession of a secured party as collateral,
his security interest in that collateral is perfected without filing
from the time he takes possession and remains perfected while the
collateral remains in his possession. 0 7 Possession by a bailee is
regarded as possession by the secured party except that for field
warehousing arrangements filing is required.108 No public filing
of field warehousing arrangements is required under present Ohio
law.
(4) The Security Interest Which Becomes Perfected by Filing.
Except when perfected by possession of the secured party, filing is
the only method of perfecting a security interest in
(a) consumer goods where the security interest is not a
purchase money security interest. Even if it is a pur-
chase money security interest, the claim for an inter-
est in consumer goods must be filed if the goods are
part of the realty,10 9
(b) equipment, other than farm equipment, whether or
not it is a purchase money security interest. A claim
for a security interest in farm equipment must be
filed if the purchase price is in excess of $2,500.00 or
if the equipment is part of the realty,"10
(c) farm products, whether or not it is a purchase money
security interest,
(d) inventory, whether or not it is a purchase money se-
curity interest.
Such filing leaves the perfected security interest in inventory
subordinate to the rights of a buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness."' This is substantially equivalent to the so-called floor plan
rule in Ohio "which estops the lienholder or the conditional vendor
of a dealer's merchandise to assert his claim against an innocent
third party, who is misled by the dealer's appearance of ownership
or of authority to sell.' 12 The Code goes a step beyond this doc-
trine of estoppel in that it protects the buyer even if he knows of
the security interest, as does the Ohio Factor's Lien Act.1 3 The
105 But not into the Ohio act.
10 6 Omo REv. CODE § 1311.60.
107 U.C.C. § 9-305(1).
108 U.C.C. § 9-305 (2).
109 U.C.C. § 9-313.
110 U.C.C. § § 9-313 and 9-302(1) (c).
111U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
112See Note, Mortgages-Agency-Sales-Effect of Floor Plan Rule
on Completing Chattel Mortgages, 7 OHio ST. L. J. 94 (1940).
113 OHIo REV. CODE § 1311.62.
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Code further provides that if the secured party in his filed financ-
ing statement has claimed an interest in the proceeds of the sale of
the collateral, a buyer in the ordinary course of business takes
free of the security interest even if the collateral is equipment.
FIXTURES, ACCESSIONS, COMMINGLING
AND PROCESSING
The Ohio rule is that the filing of a conditional sales contract
covering chattels does not protect the conditional vendor against
a subsequent grantee or mortgagee of real estate to which the
chattel has been so attached as to become a fixture. 114 The Code
provides a fairer and more workable rule.115 If the secured party
perfects by filing before the goods are attached to the realty, he
is protected against everyone, but if he repossesses, he must pay the
cost of repairing any physical damage to the realty caused by re-
moving the attached item and may be required to post security
for such cost before proceeding. If the secured party does not
perfect by filing until after the goods have been attached to the
realty, he is subordinated to any of the following who act without
knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected: sub-
sequent vendees of the realty, subsequent judgment creditors with
liens on the realty and prior mortgagees who make subsequent
advances.
The logic of the present Ohio rule is that the buyer of real
estate has no way of locating liens on fixtures since they will be
recorded in the county where the mortgagor or conditional vendee
resides and this is not always the county where the real estate is
located. The Code meets this problem by providing that a security
interest in goods which are or are to be so affixed to realty as to be
a part thereof should be filed in the office where a mortgage on the
realty concerned would be filed or recorded.116
The Code has rules for accessions similar to the fixture rules117
and also solves some of the intricate commingling and processing
problems by providing that the security interest shall continue on
a ratable (according to cost) portion of the mingled mass or proc-
1 4 Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Sav. Co., 135 Ohio St. 48 (1939);
Twentieth Century Heating Co. v. ILOL C., 56 Ohio App. 188 (1937); Brennan
v. Whitaker, 15 Ohio St. 446 (1864) (same rule as to chattel mortgages). See
Comment -Fixtures -Recording of Conditional Sale Contract as Notice to
Purchasers of Realty, 6 Omo ST. L. J. 219 (1940) and Note-Priority of Lien
- Conditional Sale Contract or Chattel Mortgage Over Real Estate Mortgage,
4 OHro ST. . J. 246 (1938).
115U.C.C. § 9-313.
116 U.C.C. § 9-401 (1) (c).
117U.C.C. § 9-314.
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essed product.1 18 Neither Ohio cas4 law nor Ohio statutes at pres-
ent deal adequately with these problems. 119
ENFORCEMENT
In Ohio the restrictions of OHno REv. CODE § 1319.14 requiring
the conditional vendor to refund or tender prior to repossession
the money paid minus reasonable compensation for use have pretty
much discouraged use of the conditional sale. On the other hand,
the provisions of OHIo REV. CODE § 1319.07, covering rights of the
chattel mortgagee upon default, set up a procedure which does not
facilitate the maximum net realization on disposal of the collateral.
In the first place, the mortgagee is encouraged to foreclose in a
court of record so that he can preserve his right to a deficiency
judgment.120 His alternative is to give a 10-day advance notice of
the sale and to sell only by bid and at a price not less than a
minimum stated in his notice. (One case permits the mortgagee to
send the notice to mortgagor at the address given in the notice even
though he knows mortgagor has moved.)' 2' The Crop Mortgage
Act, Railway Equipment Act, Factor's Lien Act, and Trust Re-
ceipts Act have no comprehensive default provisions.
The Code eliminates all the technicalities of the Chattel Mort-
gage and the Conditional Sales Acts and provides a series of cumla-
tive remedies 2 2 for the secured party which are aimed at en-
couraging a business-like disposal of the collateral at a maximum
net return without permitting overreaching by the secured party.
The rights of the debtor and the duties of the secured party may
be waived or varied only as specifically provided.123 The secured
party may always reduce his claim to judgment.12 4 He may sell
or collect on instruments 25 and may sell either the documents
or the goods covered by them.126 If the collateral is goods, he may
accept them in discharge of the obligation or may judically foreclose
or may repossess and sell after preparation for sale and may re-
cover any deficiency. 127 But when the collateral is in his possession,
118U.C.C. § 9-315.
119 See Evans, Some Applications of Title by Accession, 16 U. or CEr. L.
REv. 267 (1942); Cameron, Factors' Liens in Ohio, 23 Omro BAR 361, 364 (1950);
and Note-Chattel Mortgages- Conditional Sales -Accession, 18 Ohio Op.
496 (1940).
120 See Restrictions on Deficiency Judgment Where Chattel Mortgagee Re-
possesses Property Without Order of Court, 10 Omo ST. L. J. 470 (1949).
121 Midland Discount Co. v. White, 49 Ohio Op. 143 (1952).
122U.C.C. §§ 9-501(1) and (3).
123 U.C.C. § 9-501 (3).
124 U.C.C. § 9-501 (1).
125 U.C.c. § 9-501 (1).
126 U.C.C. § 9-501(1).
127 U.C.C. § 9-501(1).
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the secured party must take due care to protect it. 2 8 The debtor
has a carefully defined right of redemption 29 and he also has a
right to require the secured party to dispose of the collateral in ac-
cordance with Article 9.1°
Peaceable repossession is allowed 13 1 and the secured party is
also permitted to leave equipment temporarily on the debtor's
premises after rendering it unusable and to sell it from that loca-
tion.132
The secured party is given considerable discretion as to prep-
aration of the collateral for sale and the manner of the sale pro-
vided he gives reasonable notice to the debtor (but such notice is
unnecessary if the collateral is perishable or threatens to decline
rapidly in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized
market) and provided "every aspect of the disposition including
the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially
reasonable."' 133 "Commercially reasonable" is defined with some
care.13
4
To protect consumers, the holder of a purchase money security
interest must sell the collateral in 90 days after repossession if the
debtor has paid 60% of the cash price. Otherwise the consumer
can sue for conversion or for a return of the "finance charge" plus
10% of the purchase price. If the secured party does sell, the con-
sumer is liable for any deficiency. Per Code § 9-505 (1) the con-
sumer may renounce his right to insist on a resale, and might well
do so in consideration of being freed from a deficiency liability.
If the consumer has paid less than 60% of the purchase price, the
secured party may propose to keep the collateral as satisfaction
of the debt. If no objection is made in 30 days, the proposal is
deemed accepted.135
CONCLUSION
In the earlier paper on Article 9 we have discussed the priority
of conflicting security interests' 36 and the filing provisions.1 37 We
made some suggestions as to changes in the filing provisions which
are equally applicable to the security interests discussed in the
present paper. Our general conclusion in the earlier paper as to
128 cf., U.C.C. § 9-207.
129 U.C.C. § 9-506.
130 U.C.C. § 9-501(2).
131 U.C.C. § 9-503.
132 U.C.C. § 9-503.
133 U.C.C. § 9-504(2).
134 U.C.C. § 9-507 (2).
135 U.C.C. § 9-505(2).
13614 Ohio St L.J. 85 (1953).
13714 Ohio St. L.J. 78 (1953).
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security interests in accounts, contract rights and chattel paper
was that the Code is preferable to the existing Ohio law because
(a) the Code integrates its provisions for security interests in goods
into its provision for security interests in other property, particular-
ly accounts receivable arising from the sale of the goods used as
collateral, and (b) the Code has been adopted by Pennsylvania
and will be adopted by many other states. (In 1953 the Code was
introduced into the state legislatures of California, Connecticut,
Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and
Pennsylvania. Only Pennsylvania has taken final action. In 1952
an incompleted version of the Code was introduced into the New
York legislature for educational purposes. The New York Law
Revision Commission is considering the Code and is expected to
report by August, 1954.)
There are more urgent reasons for replacing the present Ohio
law relating to security interests in documents of title, instruments
and goods. In 1951 Ohio thoroughly revised its statute as to con-
tract rights and accounts receivable, and, indeed, brought the Ohio
law into substantial conformity with what is proposed by the Uni-
form Commercial Code.138 The hodge-podge of laws relating to se-
curity interests in documents of title, instruments and goods was
improved in language and organization by the Revised Code of
1953, but no attempt was made to eliminate technicalities, to inte-
grate the various statutes or to modernize them.
We have discussed ten antiquated security devices with which
Ohio lawyers and business men now struggle. Of these the trust
receipt and the conditional sale are practically never used. The
crop mortgage and the railroad equipment mortgage have been
especially drafted for particular needs. The consignment and bail-
ment lease have an uncertain legal status. The field warehouse
and the chattel mortgage require very technical compliance or the
security interest will be lost. The common law pledge lacks ade-
quate provision for temporary possession by the pledgor. The
factor's lien statute is not integrated with the assignment of ac-
counts receivable provisions.139 In short, the statutes and decisions
which comprise the Ohio law in this field are an inadequate and
complicated framework which can probably be put into a reasonably
workable pattern only by starting off with an entirely fresh ap-
proach.
Article 9 offers such a fresh structure. No other part of the
Code has been so extensively analyzed by legal scholars, checked
by counsel dealing in a practical way with the subject, and de-
bated section by section by the various competing commercial
138 See history at 14 Ohio St L.J. 75 (1953).
139 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 241.145(a).
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interests until reasonable compromises of conflicting views have
been developed. The ten antique personal property liens now
available in Ohio cannot properly serve modern commercial needs.
They should be replaced with a modern statute. Revised at meeting
after meeting of the American Law Institute and of the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, Article 9 provides Ohio the oppor-
tunity to obtain a modernized legal framework in this field. The
authors strongly recommend that this Article of the Code be adopt-
ed in Ohio.
